Julian Rode | Helmholtz-Center for Environmental Research - UFZ | Germany
Dr. Heidi Wittmer | Helmholtz-Center for Environmental Research - UFZ | Germany
Lucy Emerton | Environment Management Group | Sri Lanka
We propose “ecosystem service opportunities” (ESO) as a heuristic framework for analyzing which opportunities based on ecosystem services arise in a specific context in or around protected areas, and which economic policy or management instrument may be suitable for supporting conservation and improving local livelihoods.
Norman Laws | Leuphana University Lüneburg | Germany
How a policy field is regarded and dealt with by its practitioners is an important question when considering the issue of applied and preferred policy instruments. A new study is addressing this question regarding biodiversity policy. The study focuses on politics and its integration in Germany’s administration and political process on federal level to examine biodiversity's institutionalization.
Dimitrios Bormpoudakis | DICE, University of Kent & CAER, University of Reading | United Kingdom
Dr. Joseph Tzanopoulos | University of Kent, School of Anthropology and Conservation, DICE | United Kingdom
Simon Geoffrey Potts | University of Reading | United Kingdom
The Big Society project, launched in 2010 in England, aims to devolve power to local communities and increase participation beyond-the-state in all policy areas, including biodiversity conservation. Using critiques of post-political condition, we argue that Big Society leads to a confinement of localities to the neoliberal trajectory, advancing de-politicization of public life.
Numerous existing financial instruments implicitly manage ecosystem services. Building on PES (Payment for Ecosystem Services) experiences worldwide, the ISEP project developed an ecosystem service stakeholder identification guideline and an opportunity analysis respectively aimed at increasing participation to instruments and improving the delivery of ecosystem services.
We start with analyzing the sheep stocking problem. We then introduce ‘The Directorate for Natural Resource Management’ (DN) which may control the wolf population and may choose between different compensation menus, i.e., mixes of per animal compensation value and size of the lump sum transfer. The interaction between the farmers and DN is formulated as a Stackelberg game