

## **Individual impact of a collective program: Repartition mechanism and impact of the Mexican PES**

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This article investigates the impact of the Mexican program of payments for environmental services hydrological (the PSA-H), at community and household-level. Since 2003, the PSA-H remunerates communities for forest conservation. As most of PES initiatives, the design of the program is based on individual compensation of opportunity costs. In Mexico, most of the forest land is managed as common land by small communities. Therefore once enrolled into PSA-H, communities are free to share the payments between the different members according to their own rules. This article explores the determinants of payments repartition and discusses how it complies or conflicts with the individual compensation logic of PES. Once discussed the determinants of the share of payments received by each household, we analyze the impact of the program on their economic behavior. We investigate this issue based on community and household surveys conducted in the state of Yucatan